Introduction
[2] Lifeline interruption as a result of natural or manmade disasters can lead to widespread disruption of the daily activities of business and residential consumers. The total economic losses caused by infrastructure damage may be much higher than the value of damage to infrastructure itself. In recent years, a growing literature on methodologies to estimate the economic impacts of lifeline disruption has emerged. In particular, studies have focused on water supply, electric power, and transportation infrastructure [Chang, 2003; Chang et al., 2002; Rose, 2004; Rose et al., 1997; Tierney and Nigg, 1995] . Because of its age and spatial extent, water supply infrastructure in many urban areas is particularly vulnerable to interruption in disasters. A variety of methods-from extremely data-intensive I-O and computable general equilibrium approaches [Cochrane et al., 1999; Rose and Liao, 2005] to simpler partial equilibrium approaches [Chang, 2003; Chang et al., 2002; Khater et al., 1993] and surveys [Silicon Valley Manufacturing Group, 2002; Tierney, 1997; Tierney and Dahlhamer, 1998 ]-have been used to analyze regional impacts on business productivity as a result of water supply disruption.
[3] In this paper, we consider the estimation of economic impacts on businesses and residential consumers resulting from water supply interruption or disruption. The methodology we present for estimating business interruption losses is quite general and allows implementation of several existing methods that analyze business resilience to unexpected shocks. However, we improve on existing studies in two ways. First, we assume that marginal losses are increasing in disruption severity. Second, we assume that there is a critical water availability cutoff below which business activity ceases. We argue that each of these changes conforms better than existing models to both economic theory and limited empirical evidence. For residential loss estimation, we derive inverse demand curves that may be calibrated to local data and integrated to give willingness to pay to avoid water supply disruption. Our business interruption loss and residential welfare loss methodologies are consistent and directly comparable, consider the time profile of infrastructure repair and water supply restoration, and are spatially disaggregated so that damage estimates can be compared across regions with different patterns of business and residential water users and disruptions. Using spatial data on water outages resulting from two large potential earthquakes in the San Francisco Bay Area of California, we estimate business and residential water supply interruption losses. Our results suggest that, at least in large urban areas, the loss of welfare to residential users from lifeline interruption in some catastrophic events may approach the magnitude of business interruption losses, and thus should be included in disaster mitigation planning. Although we use earthquake-induced water supply disruption for our example, the technique presented is widely applicable to other lifeline utilities, such as transport networks and electrical systems, and to other shocks, such as hurricanes, tornados, or terrorist attacks.
[4] Section 2 of this paper presents a methodology for the estimation of business interruption losses due to water supply interruptions, and compares this methodology to existing research on postcatastrophe business resilience. In section 3, we discuss previous efforts to estimate consumers' willingness to pay to avoid water supply interruption and present a methodology for residential loss estimation. Using spatial data on water outages resulting from two large potential earthquakes in the San Francisco Bay Area of California, business and residential water supply interruption losses are estimated in section 4. Section 5 is the conclusion.
Estimating Business Losses From Water Supply Interruptions
[5] What is the potential magnitude of the impact of water shortages and outages on businesses? Khater et al. [1993] estimated that normal water service would take up to ninety days to resume following a large San Francisco Bay Area earthquake. Following Hurricane Katrina in 2005, portions of New Orleans were without water service for over two months. Following catastrophes such as this, businesses would be unable to provide running water in sinks, toilets and drains, and adequate water or pressure for fire sprinkling systems. Similarly, many large commercial and industrial businesses use rooftop cooling towers that run water through fan-powered chillers, routing water to building subsystems for drinking and sanitation, for filtration and use in industrial processes, and into closed fire protection and cooling system loops. Even closed loop cooling systems lose some water through evaporation and need replenishing in order to prevent chiller overheating and shutdown, which in turn would shut down air conditioning, laboratory temperaturecontrolled environments, computer server clusters, and any other water cooled equipment such as electrical generators and vacuum pumps. Moreover, many research and manufacturing facilities also need to pretreat and posttreat water in order to maintain required water quality standards for production and discharge. Even if alternative supplies of water, such as groundwater, are available to these industries in case of shortages, the cost and difficulty of recalibrating equipment to the change in water quality may be large.
[6] In 2002, the Silicon Valley Manufacturing Group undertook a survey of 28 corporate members on the importance of water supply reliability; more than half of the companies surveyed were involved in manufacturing, and a similar proportion were in the high-technology sector [Silicon Valley Manufacturing Group, 2002] . Two thirds of the companies surveyed suggested that a thirty day interruption in water supply water service interruption would force them to shut down completely. Additionally, many of the companies surveyed stated that they had no backup plans for the event of unexpected, severe rationing or complete water outages. Similar interviews with commer-cial and industrial water users in the San Francisco Bay Area of California also suggest that longer water supply interruptions would have serious operational impacts on businesses [Bay Area Economic Forum, 2002] .
[7] In recent years, a focus of disaster preparedness and management has been the measurement of disaster resilience in communities, where resilience has been broadly defined as the extent to which communities can absorb extreme events without large losses [Bruneau et al., 2003; Chang and Shinozuka, 2004] . In a business setting, resilience to unexpected interruption of input supply has been defined in several studies as the proportion of normal production that would occur in the event of a complete outage of that production input [Applied Technology Council, 1991; Chang, 2003; Chang et al., 2002] . Thus a business with a resilience of 1 would be able to continue indefinitely at full capacity in the event of unexpected loss of a production input (this scenario is not consistent with the assumption of profit maximization by the business). Conversely, a business with a resilience of 0 would be forced to shut down following complete loss of the production input of interest. For levels of outage less than a complete outage, previous studies have assumed that there is a linear relationship between total production loss and shortage level, and that the first 5% of any outage can be absorbed by businesses with no loss of economic activity [Applied Technology Council, 1991; Chang et al., 2002; Khater et al., 1993] .
[8] For a water supply interruption in region i at time t, the severity of the water shortage may be defined as z it 2 [0, 1], where z it = 0 corresponds to a complete outage and z it = 1 corresponds to normal service. We can account for some portion of water supply being unaffected by supply interruption (for example, through groundwater pumping or interconnectedness and mutual help agreements with other service providers) by defining a i as the proportion of water supply potentially affected by catastrophic outage in region i. Then, for industry sector j in region i with a resilience at time t of r ijt facing rationing of z it , the proportional loss of daily economic output, l ijt (z it ), is given by
Note that this definition of loss can apply to both industry sectors and individual businesses [Chang et al., 2002] .
Published empirical estimates of business resilience vary significantly. In a study of earthquake-induced outages in the San Francisco region, Khater et al. [1993] (abbreviated as KSR) report tables of predicted productivity losses by industry sector and rationing level, implying a resilience of 0.1 (the ability to operate at 10% of normal output with no water) for the electronics manufacturing industry, but of 0.8 for wholesale and retail trade. KSR assumed that productivity losses were time-invariant, so that longer water supply interruptions would not reduce output more per day than short interruptions, and thus @r ijt /@t = 0. Chang et al. [2002] (abbreviated as CSS) developed business resilience factors based on surveys of businesses following the 1994 Northridge, California earthquake [Tierney, 1997] , and from Memphis, Tennessee [Tierney and Dahlhamer, 1998 ]. Nearly all outages following the Northridge earthquake were limited to less than one week, and CSS suggested that for this interval, a complete outage would result in a wide range of business effects [Chang et al., 2002] . Data for mining, a high-resilience sector, produced an estimated resilience of 0.73, whereas health services, a low-resilience sector, had an estimated resilience of 0.27; both durable and nondurable manufacturing facilities had estimated resiliences of 0.42, and wholesale and retail trade had resiliences of around one half. Estimation for outages of more than two weeks suggested that @r ijt /@t < 0, and that after two weeks resilience in all sectors would be in the range of 0.19 to 0.44 (specific sectors as follows [Chang et al., 2002] : mining (0.44); health services (0.19); durable and nondurable manufacturing (0.28); wholesale trade (0.30); retail trade (0.28)). Although they did not calculate industry resilience, Woo and Lo also found evidence that @r ijt /@t < 0 for nonresidential users experiencing water shortages in Hong Kong [Woo and Lo, 1993] .
[9] From an economic perspective, the loss estimation equation in (1) has several shortcomings. First, firms' behavior at small levels of shortage is inconsistent with profit maximization. From equation (1), l ijt = 0 if total water availability is greater than or equal to 95% of normal. Assuming a positive price on water as a production input, this implies that all firms could make higher profits by voluntarily reducing their water use by 5 percent rather than operating at current levels. Second, a value of r ijt > 0 over time implies that firms can continue production indefinitely with zero water availability. As will be discussed below, although this may be a valid approximation for short-lived outages, it is more unreasonable for service outages that may last weeks or months. Third, for shortages greater than 5 percent, the marginal loss as shortages increase in severity is constant, as @l ijt /@z it = À(1 À r ijt )a i /0.95 and an increasing value of z it corresponds to a decreasing rationing level. A constant marginal loss implies that a business can adapt to all levels of shortage with the same ease. An alternative approach would be to assume that the marginal loss function is increasing in the level of shortage, implying that businesses find it increasingly difficult to adjust to water supply shortfall. In this paper, we propose a different loss estimation equation that deals with each of these inconsistencies: we use an increasing marginal loss as shortage severity increases, allow complete shutdown of the firm to occur, and assume that profit-maximizing behavior implies that losses are positive (though potentially very small) for all levels of water supply shortage. As the severity of rationing increases, we assume that marginal losses increase until a critical water availability cutoff is reached and business activity ceases. Water supply rationing beyond the cutoff level incurs no further damages, as output is zero.
[10] We assume that each industry sector has a minimum proportion of its normal water availability below which continuing operation is impossible, defined for sector j at time t as g jt . Thus g jt 2 [0,1), where g jt = 0 implies that sector j can operate at full capacity even if z it = 0 and the sector has no water available to it. As g jt increases, sector j becomes less and less resilient to water supply disruption and shuts down at smaller and smaller water supply shortfalls relative to normal supply. Between the cutoff level g jt and the normal daily water use defined by z it = 1, we assume that the marginal lost value of production is linear in the level of water supply cutback. The proportional daily loss of output value for industry sector j at time t in geographic region i is then given by
[11] The loss functions represented by equations (1) and (2) are compared in Figure 1 , which shows values of l ijt (z it ) for the retail trade sector calculated for different levels of water shortage. Figure 1 shows how the assumption of a constant marginal loss function (as used by KSR and CSS) versus a linear marginal loss function (equation (2)) determines the proportional loss of output for any given water shortage. All three methodologies have similar and very small losses for small decreases in available water. For more severe outages, which methodology yields the largest loss estimate depends on the duration and severity of the outage, as well as the particular value of resilience.
[12] If f it (z it ) is the probability density function of water disruptions z it in region i at time t then considering a time period of T days until the complete reinstatement of normal water service, with J business sectors in each of I regions with normal daily value of production equal to V ij , gives the following economic loss estimate for business interruption:
[13] If the probability distribution of loss profiles f it (z it ) over time is not available, a simple approximation is to use a two part distribution for z it that divides business water users into those with complete outages and those with some amount of water rationing, assumed constant across sectors in a region but allowed to vary across regions and time, given by z it . If q it is the proportion of businesses within region i that are experiencing complete outages at time t, the economic loss estimate then simplifies to
Note that if q it = 0 and z it = 1 for any region, normal water service exists and the business interruption loss estimate will be zero for water users in region i at time t. On the basis of the resolution of available information, equation (4) can easily be extended using any discrete distribution of regionspecific rationing levels.
[14] The loss estimate in (4) using either equation (1) or equation (2) represents a partial equilibrium model such as that applied by Khater et al. [1993] or Chang et al. [2002] . Alternative approaches to hazard loss estimation that explicitly include the interlinkages between industries include I-O and computable general equilibrium (CGE) models [Cochrane et al., 1999; Rose and Liao, 2005] . As Rose [2004] discusses, I-O models are linear and rigid and do not allow input substitution by industries. As a result, I-O models represent upper bounds on direct and indirect loss estimates. Conversely, CGE modeling does allow the analysis of the potential role of price signals or input substitutability across linked industries and the labor market in determining the potential economic impacts resulting from catastrophic water supply shortages [Rose and Liao, 2005] . However, in a catastrophe loss estimation setting, CGE models have two serious shortcomings. First, such models were developed to analyze long-run equilibrium resulting from changes in the price or availability of inputs, and the resulting behavioral adjustments across the economy. Arguably, catastrophic lifeline interruption is an extremely short term, disequilibrium phenomenon during which policy makers care most about immediate costs. Second, because of the underlying CES production functions used, CGE modeling cannot analyze the impacts resulting from complete outage of any production input. Thus such models must either assume that complete outages cannot occur or that every industry has costless, indefinite availability of backup supplies. Moreover, in a detailed CGE study of water supply shortages in the Portland metropolitan area, Rose and Liao [Rose and Liao, 2005] found that estimated indirect impacts were only about 22 percent of estimated direct impacts (equivalent to a multiplier effect of 1.22), and that both positive and negative indirect effects were observed. Thus, given that the data requirements for a wellexecuted I-O or CGE model are large and that previous studies suggest that differences in estimated impacts may be relatively small overall and of ambiguous sign by industry, we argue that a simple business loss estimation methodology such as that presented in equations (2) -(4) is both extremely useful for decision makers and easy to implement and interpret.
[15] There are several important issues in the estimation of the economic impacts of water supply interruption that are outside of the scope of analysis of this paper (Rose [2004] provides a detailed discussion of many of these issues). These include irreversible damages related to water supply interruptions, double counting of damages, and the role of water supply outages in exacerbating fire following earthquakes. We discuss each of these concerns briefly below.
[16] The methodology presented in this paper assumes that the only economic impacts on businesses from water rationing and outages are from lost revenue, and that the scale of economic output can be changed instantaneously and with no cost. However, extended business closures due to water supply interruption may entail irreversibility (at a local scale) if businesses either shift purchasing or relocate permanently to a different region. Thus the long-term damage from a reduced economic base and lower employment could be considerable, even after the region as a whole has recovered from the immediate effects of a catastrophe and attendant lifeline disruption.
[17] We focus on the estimation of economic impacts specifically related to water supply interruption. Of course, total economic damages resulting from loss of life or property in a catastrophe such as a major earthquake would be enormous. However, analyzing those impacts is beyond the scope of this paper. Here, we do not consider damages to life, property, or other lifelines resulting from the catastrophic event that caused water supply interruption. One way to view this is as an implicit assumption that there is no overlap between catastrophe-related damages to the water supply infrastructure and other damages. This may be correct for some kinds of catastrophes such as targeted terrorist attacks or natural hazards that affect lifelines at a distance from the populations they serve. However, it is quite clear that businesses and residences that are destroyed by ground shaking in an earthquake are unable to experience losses due to water supply shortages in the postearthquake period. We argue that, at least for many potential catastrophes in the developed world, our methodology is (1) and (2) together with retail trade resilience estimates.
relatively insensitive to the effects of such double counting. This is because even earthquakes in major urban areas are predicted to kill only a small proportion of the population and destroy a relatively small proportion of the stock of buildings. As a result, economic losses from water supply interruption to businesses and residences that are relatively undamaged in a catastrophe will generally far outweigh the double counting of damages to destroyed property. Note that for some natural catastrophes, double counting may be an issue. For example, if large areas of a city are inundated by a storm surge, as was the case with Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans, water supply interruption to these areas will not lead to any further incremental damage.
[18] Finally, one of the major potential impacts of water supply shortages is that the operation of emergency services may be compromised . In particular, if water is not available for fire fighting purposes, fires may spread further or burn uncontrolled. Fire-related losses to property will thus almost certainly increase. The differential increase in fire damage is an indirect economic loss attributable to water shortages. Estimates of incremental fire damage as a result of water supply interruption will depend on both the nature of the catastrophe and the availability of secondary water supplies and other technology in the region of interest.
Estimating Residential Losses From Water Supply Interruptions
[19] Using the concept of resilience to define economic losses is not as useful in a residential setting as in a business setting, as residential water users do not produce an output with monetary value. However, it is clear that water supply interruptions can impose a significant hardship on residential users. Losses can be measured by consumers' willingness to pay to avoid water service interruptions, defined as the amount of money that residential customers would pay in order to avoid a break in water service of some duration.
[20] Residential water use falls into several broad categories, such as drinking and basic sanitation, bathing and cooking, laundry use, and outdoor irrigation. The willingness to pay for water by residential customers will also depend on the intended use of water. Thus residential consumers will be willing to pay a large amount of money for water for drinking and basic sanitation, less for water to wash clothes, and a much smaller amount for water for washing cars, filling swimming pools, and outdoor irrigation. In order to analyze indirect economic losses to residential customers from water supply interruption, it is necessary to estimate willingness to pay for any potential shortfall in available water. Because reliable empirical data on consumer demand under significant water shortages are unavailable, alternative approaches must be taken to estimate demand. Three separate approaches have been used to generate estimates of willingness to pay to avoid water supply interruption: contingent valuation, mathematical programming, and integration of estimated demand curves. Below, we discuss each of these methodologies and their advantages and limitations.
[21] Stated preference techniques may be used for the direct elicitation of willingness to pay. In this case, an appropriate survey instrument is administered to a representative sample of residential water users, and econometric analysis is used to estimate a willingness to pay function. Contingent valuation has been applied in the estimation of residential willingness to pay for increased water supply reliability by several previous studies [Barakat and Chamberlin, Inc., 1994; Griffin and Mjelde, 2000; Howe and Smith, 1993; Howe et al., 1994] . In general, these studies consider consumers' choices between alternative probabilistic shortage scenarios, and thus provide estimates of value for changes in water supply reliability. Moreover, existing studies consider relatively small water supply shortfalls (Barakat and Chamberlin, Inc. consider shortages of 10 -50%, Griffin and Mjelde consider the range 10-30%, and Howe and Smith and Howe et al. consider a ''standard annual shortage event'' where residential outdoor use is restricted to 3 hours a day, but indoor use is unrestricted), and no existing study attempts to value residential welfare loss from complete water supply outages.
[22] Taken together, contingent valuation studies suggest that consumers are fairly insensitive in their valuation of the severity, duration, and frequency of water supply shortfall. Several studies have found threshold effects, with a high willingness to pay to avoid any shortage, and then decreasing average willingness to pay to avoid shortages of increased duration, severity, or frequency [Barakat and Chamberlin, Inc., 1994; Griffin and Mjelde, 2000] . For example, data from northern Colorado reported in Griffin and Mjelde [Griffin and Mjelde, 2000 ] suggest a total household willingness to pay to avoid immediate, known shortfalls of WTP = $18.41 + $0.212 Â (% water shortage) + $0.344 Â (days of shortage). Griffin and Mjelde also find inconsistencies in their results: consumers stated higher monthly willingness to pay to avoid future, probabilistic water supply shortages than total willingness to pay to avoid immediate shortages of the same duration and severity. In a comprehensive survey covering all California water agencies, Barakat and Chamberlin, Inc. [1994] found mean monthly household willingness to pay ranging from $11.63 to avoid a yearlong 10 percent reduction service with an expected frequency of one in ten years, to a monthly value of $16.92 to avoid a yearlong 50 percent reduction in service with an expected frequency of one in twenty years. Additionally, the Barakat and Chamberlin study found that consumers were more likely to pay higher amounts to avoid larger, infrequent shortages than small, frequent shortages.
[23] In an alternative approach to stated preference studies, Lund [1995] assumes that consumers exhibit costminimizing behavior and uses a mathematical programming approach to analyze the costs of alternative short-and longterm conservation measures that consumers could implement to avoid the impacts of water shortage. Although he does not provide durations of expected shortfall, he considers shortages of between 50 and 200 gallons per household per day, yielding estimates of willingness to pay of between $51.03 per household per year and $144.10 per household per year for the shortage scenarios considered.
[24] Finally, construction of residential demand functions for water allows direct estimation of willingness to pay. This approach was used by Jenkins et al. [2003] to estimate the costs of urban water scarcity under current institutional and hydrological conditions and predicted California population and industrial water demand for 2020. Because adequate empirical data to characterize the demand function for all levels of water shortage do not exist, Jenkins et al. assumed a constant elasticity demand function, calibrated using regional observed prices and quantities consumed and estimates of the price elasticity of demand. Using these calibrated demand functions, Jenkins et al. estimate monthly loss functions for shortages of up to 50% rationing levels, and suggest that by 2020, the average annual cost of urban water scarcity in California could be as high as $1.6 billion.
[25] In this study, we adapt the approach of Jenkins et al. [2003] by deriving an equation for the estimation of consumer willingness to pay to avoid water supply interruptions. Residential welfare losses from water supply interruption can then be analyzed in a framework analogous to that developed for businesses in section 2. By definition, the price elasticity of demand for water at any price P and quantity consumed Q is given by h = (dQ/dP)(P/Q). This definition may be rearranged and integrated to give an inverse demand function for water, namely P(Q) = e (ln Q)/h+C , where C is a constant of integration. Integrating this expression for P(Q) will give a consumer's willingness to pay to avoid water shortages, where the willingness to pay to avoid a shortage equivalent to any restricted quantity of water consumed is given by the area under the demand curve between the unrestricted consumption quantity and that restricted quantity. Define the water price and quantity consumed when there are no shortages as P baseline and Q baseline respectively. Then the daily loss of welfare W i (z it ) for a consumer in region i experiencing a water shortage at time t of z it , leading to a reduced water availability given by
where the second line uses the results that @/@Q{h/(1 + h)Qe (ln Q)/h + C } = e (ln Q)/h + C and that P(Q 1 )/P(Q 2 ) = (Q 1 / Q 2 ) 1/h . The second line of equation (5) is valid when À1 < h < 0, implying an inelastic residential demand for water. This assumption is not unduly restrictive, as a meta-analysis by Espey et al. [1997] found that 90% of reported residential price elasticities of demand for water were in the range (À0.75, 0), and meta-analysis by Dalhuisen et al. [2003] reported a mean price elasticity of demand of À0.41, a median price elasticity of À0.35, and suggested that in general residential demand for water is price inelastic.
[26] Note that with a constant elasticity demand function, the willingness to pay to avoid a complete water supply outage (Q r = 0) is not defined. Here, we assume that the government would be able to provide a minimum amount of water to maintain basic health and sanitation throughout the period of complete outages (for example, by trucking water to distribution points), and that consumers in affected areas would not generally face a price for access to this water. However, provision and distribution of water for basic health and sanitation in large urban areas would be extremely costly to the government; we assume that these costs would be paid for by all taxpayers rather than consumers in the area of the outage. The costs of emergency water provision thus represent a social cost of water supply outage, but their calculation is beyond the scope of this paper. Thus equation (5) does not attempt to value how much consumers would pay to stay alive, but how much they value water above their basic requirements. As such, residential loss estimates calculated using equation (5) should be viewed as lower bounds.
[27] The United Nations defines a ''basic water requirement'' of 6.6 gallons per capita per day as the minimum required for drinking and basic sanitation, and a minimum requirement of 13.2 gallons per capita per day (gpcpd) when bathing and cooking are included [Gleick, 1996] . These amounts may be thought of as the minimum needed to survive for an extended period of time, such as would be encountered following a major earthquake. Thus we constrain the water availability Q r (z it ) to be in the interval [BWR, Q baseline ]. We report results from assuming BWR takes values of 6.6 gallons per capita per day, 10 gallons per capita per day, and 13.2 gallons per capita per day to capture the possible sensitivity of cutoff choice as a result of using a constant elasticity demand function. Average per capita daily demands for residential users can be used for the value of Q baseline in equation (5). If Q r (z it ) is calculated using the assumption that basic water requirements for health and sanitation are met, then Q r (z it ) = BWR + (1 À a i (1 À z it ))(Q baseline À BWR), where as in the business loss estimation, a i represents the proportion of region i's water supply affected by interruption. Note also that from equation (5) we have assumed that willingness to pay to avoid water shortages does not change over time. This is a conservative assumption; it is likely that willingness to pay for any quantity of water will increase with the length of the disruption, particularly as the possibility of irreversible damage to investments such as landscaping increases.
[28] In order to obtain an estimate of the overall indirect losses from water supply interruption, the individual daily welfare losses W i need to be aggregated across consumers in each region and across regions. Define N i as the number of residential consumers in region i and f it (z it ) as the probability density function of water disruption in region i at time t. Then, considering I regions and a time period of T days until the complete reinstatement of normal water service gives the following residential economic loss estimate:
If detailed information on the probability distribution of loss profiles f it (z it ) over time is not available, a simple discrete approximation dividing consumers into two groups, those with complete outages and those with some rationing, may be used instead. If q it is the proportion of residential consumers within region i that are experiencing complete outages, the residential economic loss estimate (equation (6)) simplifies to
The second line of equation (7) is directly analogous to the simple equation for business interruption losses, equation (4). In the residential context, N i W i (0) is the total consumer surplus of residential water users in region i during a period of normal water service, and W i (z it )/W i (0) is the proportion of consumer surplus remaining at rationing level z it . Note that for regions where a i < 1, a rationing level of z it = 0 corresponds to some availability of water from alternative sources, such as groundwater or interlinkages and mutual help agreements with other service providers. Note also that equation (7) assumes that residential consumers' willingness to pay to avoid water supply interruptions are homogeneous within any region. If there are large intraregional variations in willingness to pay, as may be the case if there are significantly different residential types such as apartments and large single-family houses, then equation (7) may be easily extended to include this heterogeneity as well.
Example: Earthquake-Induced Water Supply Interruption in the San Francisco Bay Area, California
[29] As an example of our methodology, we estimate the economic losses to businesses and residential water users resulting from earthquake-induced disruption of one of the major water supply systems of the San Francisco Bay Area of California. We consider two potential earthquake scenarios: a magnitude 7.9 earthquake on the San Andreas Fault, and a magnitude 7.1 earthquake on the Hayward Fault.
[30] San Francisco's water system captures rain and snowmelt runoff in the Hetch Hetchy reservoir in the Sierra Nevada mountains near Yosemite National Park, and moves it through a 167-mile series of tunnels, aqueducts, treatment plants and pipelines, to reservoirs and turnouts along its route through the southern portion of the Bay Area and into the city of San Francisco. The Hetch Hetchy system is managed and run by the San Francisco Public Utility Commission (SFPUC). Hetch Hetchy facilities cross at least five active earthquake fault zones: the San Andreas, Hayward, Calaveras, Greenville, and Great Valley fault zones. A probability of around 60% is assigned to the occurrence of a major, damaging earthquake in the greater San Francisco Bay Region by 2031 [Working Group On California Earthquake Probabilities, 2003]. All of the major Hetch Hetchy facility components are at least fifty years old [Bay Area Economic Forum, 2002] . Some, including the Crystal Springs and San Andreas dams and reservoirs, predate the Hetch Hetchy system and were constructed in the nineteenth century. Key sections of the Hetch Hetchy delivery system have not been seismically retrofitted and braced, and most facilities have little or no redundancy built into them, so that even relatively small system failures can cut off service while repairs are undertaken.
[31] The Hetch Hetchy system routes 260 million gallons per day (mgd) of water to 2.4 million customers in four counties [Bay Area Economic Forum, 2002] . The city of San Francisco, with a population of 800,000, uses approximately one third of Hetch Hetchy water. The remainder is supplied to 28 suburban water authorities and other large wholesale customers represented in negotiations with SFPUC by the Bay Area Water Supply and Conservation Agency (BAWSCA; previously known as the Bay Area Water Users Association, or BAWUA). Although several large water agencies (Alameda County Water District, Santa Clara, Milpitas, Sunnyvale, and Daly City) have diversified supplies, seventeen of the suburban customers are completely dependent on Hetch Hetchy for their water and another six are more than 75% dependent on it (Table 1 and Figure 2 ).
Water Supply Interruption and Restoration Profiles
[32] Existing geotechnical reports prepared for BAWUA and the SFPUC Facilities Reliability Program (Phase II) outline the spatial distribution of water supply outages and system recovery following major earthquakes [Eidinger, 2001; Water Reliability Partnership, 2000] . Earthquakeinduced damage to the Hetch Hetchy water supply system will produce two kinds of impacts on water users. First, following a major earthquake, some proportion of water users will experience a complete loss of SFPUC water supply (q in equations (4) and (7)). Note that a complete outage of SFPUC water only corresponds to zero water availability for those users for which a i = 1 (Table 1) . and Eidinger [2001] . The supply fraction a i represents the proportion of water consumed in water agency i delivered from the Hetch Hetchy system. The value of P baseline for Stanford was taken to be the same as that for Palo Alto, and prices for Cordilleras and Los Trancos were taken as the average cost for special districts [Bay Area Water Supply and Conservation Agency, 2006 ]. The city of San Francisco operates tiered pricing based on conservation affidavits on file, but in 2002 total commodity charges per residential user were equal to those of San Jose; accordingly, we adjust for the difference in average daily use to estimate P baseline . b ADD is average daily demand.
Second, those users that still receive water via the piped system (a proportion of users given by 1 À q) may nonetheless have water rationing during the system repair and recovery period, with the proportion of normal water service available to these users in region i at time t given by 1 À a i (1 À z it ). On the basis of information by Eidinger [2001] , we define six geographic regions for the San Andreas M 7.9 earthquake event and four geographic regions for the Hayward M 7.1 earthquake event. Within each of these regions, Hetch Hetchy water users will experience similar time profiles of water supply outages and rationing until normal service is restored. The pattern of water supply interruption and rationing following a major earthquake is shown for each group in Figures 3 and 4 . Note that the time profiles of water supply outages and rationing for the two earthquake scenarios are based on engineering analyses of the Hetch Hetchy system alone. Earthquakeinduced effects on adjacent water service providers such as the East Bay Municipal Utility District or the Santa Clara Valley Water District, as well as these providers' potential responses to earthquakes, are beyond the scope of this analysis. However, for those users that have interlinkages with other service providers, or alternative sources of water such as groundwater (see the values of a i in Table 1 ), we make the conservative assumption that in any earthquake event, these alternative sources will be able to continue operating at normal service levels, so that the range of possible rationing levels for service provider i at time t is given by [1 À a i (1 À z it ), 1].
Business Loss Estimates
[33] Business and institutional users account for 30% of San Francisco water demand (26 mgd) and 25% of demand throughout the BAWSCA service territory (65 mgd). Important users of Hetch Hetchy water include the computer, semiconductor, biotechnology, automotive, aerospace, tourism, and telecommunications industries, electric utilities, as well as schools and hospitals and smaller water-dependent businesses such as restaurants, glass and metal fabricators, beverage plants and food processors.
[34] As functional relationships between water use and value of output for individual industries are presently unavailable, we use county-level data from the 2002 U.S. Economic Census (available at http://www.census.gov/ econ/census02), and focus on five sectors of activity: manufacturing; wholesale trade; retail trade; professional, technical and scientific services; and accommodation and food services. Together, these five sectors account for the Note also that Guadalupe Valley is excluded from our analysis because of insufficient data. majority of economic activity within the Bay Area. The relevant four counties for the analysis are San Mateo County, San Francisco County, Alameda County and Santa Clara County. In 2002, the total annual value for the five sectors used in the production loss analysis for these four counties was $334 billion, with county-and sector-specific values shown in Table 2 . We assume that the SFPUC water supply system provides water to the whole of San Mateo and San Francisco Counties, and to businesses that account for 50% and 80% of economic activity in Alameda County and Santa Clara County, respectively. County-level economic activity data can then be decomposed into the same geographic groups as the water supply impacts in Figures 3 and 4 (see Table 3 ). For each group, we assume that the reliance of businesses on SFPUC water as a proportion of their total water use is given by the mean of a i values for water agencies within that particular group. For the group definitions used in the analysis and shown in Figures 3 and 4 , the group mean values of a i are between 0.44 and 1.
[35] Using equations (1), (2), and (4), the data in Tables 1, 2, and 3 and the water supply interruption and restoration profiles in Figures 3 and 4 , business losses from water supply interruption were estimated for the two water supply interruption and restoration scenarios (Tables 4, 5, and 6). We estimate four different business loss models:
[36] 1. Equation (2) (linear marginal loss), assuming that shutdown is possible, so that r ijt = 0, that g jt = 0.5 for the manufacturing and accommodation and food sectors, and that g jt = 0.2 for the other sectors analyzed.
[37] 2. Equation (2) (linear marginal loss), assuming that shutdown is not possible so that r ijt > 0, that @r ijt /@t < 0, using industry sector-specific data on r ijt from Chang et al. [2002] , that g jt = 0.5 for the manufacturing and accommodation and food sectors, and that g jt = 0.2 for the other sectors analyzed.
[38] 3. Equation (1) (constant marginal loss), assuming that shutdown is not possible so that r ijt > 0 and that @r ijt / @t < 0, using industry sector-specific data on r ijt from Chang et al. [2002] .
[39] 4. Equation (1) (constant marginal loss), assuming that shutdown is not possible so that r ijt > 0 and that @r ijt / @t = 0, using industry sector-specific data on r ijt from Khater et al. [1993] . Figure 3 . Water supply interruptions and rationing to Hetch Hetchy customers resulting from a San Andreas Fault M 7.9 earthquake. The variable q represents the proportion of customers in each group that are without Hetch Hetchy water. For those customers receiving Hetch Hetchy water, the variable z represents the rationing level (where z = 1 corresponds to no rationing). Note that both q and z are bounded in the interval [0, 1] and that water agencies for which a i < 1 will have higher levels of overall available water in the range [1 À a i (1 À z it ), 1]. Group membership by BAWSCA and other agencies is defined as follows: group 1 (Brisbane, Burlingame, CWS -Mid Peninsula, CWS -South San Francisco, Estero, Hillsborough, Millbrae, North Coast, and Westborough), group 2 (Daly City and San Bruno), group 3 (Belmont, CWS -Bear Gulch, Cordilleras, East Palo Alto, Los Trancos, Menlo Park, Palo Alto (City), Purissima Hills, Redwood City, San Jose, and Skyline), group 4 (Milpitas, Mountain View, Santa Clara, Stanford, and Sunnyvale), group 5 (Alameda and Hayward), and group 6 (San Francisco). Information in this figure is adapted from Eidinger [2001] .
[40] For Model 1, Table 4 shows the group-and sectorspecific damages for the M 7.9 San Andreas earthquake scenario, and Table 5 shows the group-and sector-specific damages for the M 7.1 Hayward earthquake scenario. The total business interruption loss estimates using Model 1 are $14.4 billion for the San Andreas earthquake scenario over the sixty day period before the full resumption of normal water service. By sector, the total loss estimates are as follows: manufacturing ($3.9 billion); wholesale trade ($4.9 billion); retail trade ($2.4 billion); professional, scientific and technical services ($2.6 billion); and accommodation and food services ($0.7 billion). Unsurprisingly, the largest group losses occur in groups 1, 3, and 6, which are predicted to have the most severe water disruptions. Losses in group 4, which includes a large portion of economic Shown is the proportion of each county's business activity that is located in each group with similar water supply interruption and restoration profiles (see Figures 3 and 4) . For example, we assume that 50% of business activity in Alameda county is potentially impacted and 80% of business activity in Santa Clara county is potentially impacted by interruption of Hetch Hetchy service. Figure 3 . Group membership by BAWSCA and other agencies is defined as follows: group 1 (CWS -Bear Gulch, Cordilleras, East Palo Alto, Hayward, Palo Alto (City), Redwood City, San Jose, and Skyline), group 2 (Alameda, Milpitas, Santa Clara, Stanford, and Sunnyvale), group 3 (San Francisco), and group 4 (Belmont, Brisbane, Burlingame, CWS -Mid Peninsula, CWS -South San Francisco, Coastside, Cordilleras, Daly City, Estero, Hillsborough, Los Trancos, Menlo Park, Millbrae, Mountain View, North Coast, Palo Alto (City), Purissima Hills, Redwood City, San Bruno, Stanford, and Westborough). Italics denote cities with partial shortages within the group; it is assumed that half of the daily water demand for these water providers is unaffected by an M 7.1 earthquake on the Hayward Fault, and the remainder follows the graphs above. Information in this figure is adapted from Eidinger [2001] . activity in Santa Clara county, are reduced by the availability of alternative water sources (compare Tables 1, 2, and 3).
[41] Total business interruption losses are estimated as $9.3 billion for the Hayward earthquake scenario using Model 1 (Table 5 ). By sector, the total loss estimates are as follows: manufacturing ($3.3 billion); wholesale trade ($3.4 billion); retail trade ($1.3 billion); professional, scientific and technical services ($1.0 billion); and accommodation and food services ($0.3 billion). In this scenario, losses by geographic group are greatest in groups 1 and 2, which are closest to the Hayward fault and are predicted to have the most severe shortages (Figure 4 ). Note that in this scenario, San Francisco and adjacent areas on the San Francisco peninsula (groups 3 and 4) are estimated to have relatively small losses, even though there is significant economic activity, because shortages are predicted to be quite limited in nature.
[42] Total business loss estimates for the two earthquake scenarios and each of the four models described above are presented in Table 6 . All four models produce loss estimates of the same order of magnitude, with the San Andreas earthquake scenario producing losses approximately 50% higher than the Hayward earthquake scenario. Model 4, which assumes that shutdown does not occur as a result of water supply interruption and that resilience is constant over time, and uses industry-specific resilience estimates from KSR, yields the lowest estimates for both earthquake scenarios. Model 1, using a linear marginal loss (equation (2)) and allowing shutdown in the case of severe shortages, yields the highest estimates of business losses. All of these business loss estimates are enormous: many billions of dollars for water supply interruption without considering any other damages. However, the region impacted by our earthquake scenarios includes the high-technology hub of Silicon Valley, as well as many other high-value businesses. As a further comparison, Chang et al. [2002] analyzed the consequences of water supply disruption from an M 7.5 earthquake close to Memphis, Tennessee. They estimated that during extended water supply disruption, mean monthly losses would be 20.5% of monthly gross output. Using the Model 1 results (Table 6 ), this study finds that mean monthly losses during the San Andreas earthquake scenario would be 25.9% of monthly gross output (calculated as 14.41/(334/6)), and mean monthly losses during the Hayward earthquake scenario would be 16.8% of monthly gross output. Thus our loss estimates are quite consistent with the study of Chang et al., particularly given that the earthquake magnitude scale is logarithmic.
Residential Loss Estimates
[43] The SFPUC water supply system provides service to a residential customer base of 2.4 million people. Data available from the FY 1999-2000 BAWUA annual survey provide residential per capita water use (Table 1 and Bay Area Water Users Association [2000] ). In the Hetch Hetchy service area, residential water consumption varies from a low of 50.9 gallons per capita per day in the East Palo Alto Water District to a high of 321.2 gallons per capita per day in the Purissima Hills Water District (Table 1 and Figure 2 ). The differences in average residential water use across SFPUC customers in large part reflect differences in amount of outdoor irrigation. Average per capita daily demands for residential users from each water provider were used for the value of Q baseline in equation (5) ( Table 1) , and Q r (z it ) was calculated using the assumption that basic water requirements for health and sanitation were met, so that Q r (z it ) = BWR + (1 À a i (1 À z it ))(Q baseline À BWR). Similarly, values of P baseline were calculated from reported water provider average consumer costs per unit of water, exclusive of [44] Losses to residential consumers following our two scenario earthquakes were calculated using equations (5) and (7), the data in Table 1 , water supply interruption and restoration profiles in Figures 3 and 4 , a price elasticity of demand for residential water of À0.41, and a basic water requirement of 10 gpcpd. Following a magnitude 7.9 earthquake on the San Andreas Fault, our methodology estimates residential losses of $279.20 million, with the largest losses closest to the fault in the San Francisco peninsula (Table 7) . Losses outside of the peninsula region are predicted to be quite small, totalling less than $2.5 million, as water interruption is limited to relatively small, short outages. Similarly, even though group 2 (Daly City and San Bruno) is located close to the San Andreas fault, residential welfare losses are estimated to be small as there is a limited reliance on Hetch Hetchy water, and our analysis assumes that alternative sources of water are unaffected by the disruption scenario. Conversely, in the M 7.1 Hayward fault scenario, residential welfare losses are estimated to total $36.94 million, with almost all welfare losses occurring in the East Bay and only relatively small losses on the San Francisco Peninsula (Table 7) .
[45] In order to determine how residential welfare losses as determined by equation (5) vary with the choice of price elasticity of demand and basic water requirement, we calculated losses using alternative values of h and BWR (Table 8) . Alternative values of h chosen were À0.35 and À0.51, following the median and mean values reported in the meta-analyses of Dalhuisen et al. [2003] and Espey et al. [1997] , respectively. As expected from equation (5), estimates of welfare loss increase as residential water use becomes more price inelastic, or as basic water requirement (the lower cutoff for welfare measurement in equation (5)) decreases. In particular, a more price-inelastic residential water demand increases the loss estimates more for the San Andreas earthquake scenario than for the Hayward scenario. This is because a larger proportion of residential consumers experience severe outages in the former scenario than the latter (compare Figures 3 and 4) , and this translates into much higher willingness to pay estimates with a more inelastic demand. In the context of the model presented here, a lower basic water requirement may be interpreted as corresponding to a situation where the government is able to distribute less emergency water to residential consumers on a daily basis.
[46] Note that equation (5) and our residential loss estimation methodology only calculate willingness to pay for water in excess of the chosen basic water requirement. It is assumed that the government will not allow residential consumers to experience complete loss of water for health and sanitization. However, it is clear that supplying water for residential consumers' health and sanitation purposes for extended periods would be extremely expensive (for example, current charges for tanker-transported water in the Bay Area are around 1 cent per gallon per mile), and costs to the government represent social costs. Moreover, given consumers' observed willingness to pay for bottled water, some consumers would certainly be willing to pay extremely large amounts for their first few gallons of water.
[47] By ignoring government costs for the emergency provision of water, we underestimate the social cost of residential water supply shortages. Thus, because our analysis allows businesses to experience complete outages, there Group definitions and time paths of water supply interruption and rationing by group follow Figure 3 for the San Andreas Fault M 7.9 scenario and Figure 4 for the Hayward Fault M 7.1 scenario; note that group definitions vary by earthquake scenario. Welfare losses are reported in millions of dollars. Estimates assume that BWR = 10 gpcpd and that h = À0.41. Table 7 are shown in bold and assume that BWR = 10 gpcpd and that h = À0.41 (following the mean reported in the meta-analysis of Dalhuisen et al. [2003] ). Dalhuisen et al. report a median residential price elasticity of demand for water of À0.35, while the meta-analysis of Espey et al. [1997] reports a value of À0.51.
is an asymmetry in comparing business and residential losses from water supply shortfall and the residential estimates based on equation (5) should be viewed as lower bounds. Rigorous analysis of the costs of emergency water provision is a subject for future research, but these costs are likely to be very large. For example, if we assume that the costs of providing emergency water are given by NTX where N is the number of consumers, T is the duration of outage and attendant government water provision, and X is the daily per capita cost of water provision, then a thirty day outage in the Bay Area affecting a million consumers who require 10 gpcpd and an average hundred-mile round trip for water tankers will cost $300 million for transportation costs alone. Logistics and distribution costs of water would increase this amount enormously.
[48] In terms of risk preparedness policy, using a constant price elasticity of demand to calculate residential losses produces large heterogeneity in impacts as a function of location of water demand relative to the earthquake epicenter, and of the availability of alternative, unaffected water supplies. In the two earthquake scenarios we considered, the smaller M 7.1 Hayward earthquake resulted in relatively small residential losses, as most residential water users only suffered small water supply shortfalls. The relatively large M 7.9 San Andreas earthquake is predicted to result in large residential losses (although still not of the same magnitude as business losses). From a planning perspective, this suggests that postearthquake residential water supply restoration efforts that aim to reduce welfare losses should initially target very specific regions; this will be particularly true if some areas have complete outages and the government must provide water for health and sanitation. For small earthquakes that do not lead to severe water shortages to residential users, water supply restoration efforts should focus on business users.
Conclusion
[49] This paper has presented simple methodologies for the estimation of the impacts of water supply interruption and disruption on businesses and residential welfare. Both methodologies use time profiles of water service interruption, rationing, and restoration combined with flexible loss equations that are calibrated to local economic data. For business interruption losses due to water supply disruption, the marginal value of water may be parameterized using the value of normal output and business resilience. In this paper, we assume that the marginal loss due to water supply disruption is increasing in the severity of the disruption, and that extremely severe disruptions or complete outages will lead to businesses shutting down. Residential loss estimation uses constant elasticity demand functions that are calibrated to local price and quantity data and integrated to estimate willingness to pay to avoid water shortages of any given severity and duration.
[50] As an example of our methodology, we estimate the economic losses to businesses and residential water users of one of the major water supply systems of the San Francisco Bay Area of California resulting from two potential earthquake scenarios. A magnitude 7.9 earthquake on the San Andreas Fault is estimated to lead to $14.4 billion in business interruption losses and $279 million in residential welfare losses over the sixty day period before the resump-tion of normal service. A magnitude 7.1 earthquake on the Hayward Fault is estimated to lead to $9.3 billion in business interruption losses and $37 million in residential welfare losses over the sixty day period before the resumption of normal service. The large difference between the business and residential loss estimates is partly due to a lack of data from extreme shortages with which to calibrate our residential loss estimation function. We assume that the government will be able to provide water for health and sanitation purposes to residential consumers during the most severe disruptions. Thus the reported residential losses should be viewed as lower bounds, as the social cost of government emergency water provision is not included in our estimates, but is likely to be high.
[51] As a comparison to our business loss estimates, we also calculate losses using several previously published business loss functions and industry-specific data. These include functional forms with constant marginal loss as water supply disruption increases, and forms that allow business resilience to decrease as the duration of water supply interruption increases. For the water supply interruption and restoration profiles considered, we obtain similar results with all methodologies, although modeling industry shutdown under large outages increases loss estimates. For large earthquakes such as the M 7.9 San Andreas Fault scenario considered, residential losses from water supply interruption may be large. However, assuming that the government can provide water to meet basic health and sanitation requirements, residential losses will be much less than business interruption losses. Our results imply that business and residential losses following earthquakes may be highly variable over space and time, and by industry type, suggesting that adaptable mitigation strategies are needed to account for such variability.
